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Abstract 
 
The Coalition Government’s first Comprehensive Spending Review will cut 40% 
from university budgets by 2014.  This will result in an increasingly tension-prone 
political economy of UK higher education.  As it is, the sector already sits 
uncomfortably astride the two distinct welfare models currently in existence in 
Britain.  As the fees agenda has taken hold, university degrees have been increasingly 
susceptible to being rebranded as a strategic investment in the future, thus acting as an 
exemplar for the move towards an asset-based system of welfare.  Despite this, even 
in the post-Browne world students will still not be charged the full market price of 
delivering degree programmes.  Higher education institutions therefore continue to be 
redistributive mechanisms providing long-term welfare-enhancing transfer payments 
to their overwhelmingly middle-class student base.  The budget cuts and the 
associated changes to student finance will bring into stark relief the contradictions of 
serving two welfare masters at once. 
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The Contradictory Political Economy of UK Higher Education 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The announcement in October 2010 of the basic outline of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review confirmed that UK universities would face a 40% reduction in 
central government funding.
1
  Immediately on entering office, Cameron’s 
Conservative-led Coalition set about the task of creating an aura of austerity designed 
to leave the impression of the inevitability of lower levels of public expenditure in the 
future.  In this context few eyebrows were raised when Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne committed Business Secretary Vince Cable to finding the full 40% 
budget cut for universities that all departments had been forced to cost.  The only 
questions still to be resolved as the cuts are introduced sequentially over coming years 
are how many universities will be left standing and in what state of emaciation when 
the process is complete. 
 
The economics of UK higher education are therefore already set in stone for the near 
future.  They will be dominated by the forced requirement to do more with less, to put 
increased pressure on existing human resources without any additional reward, and to 
flirt as brazenly as possible with the breaking point of universities’ underlying 
business models.  There will be additional fee income as the recommendations of the 
Browne Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance are implemented, 
yet this can only be expected to partially cover the money being taken out of the 
sector as a whole on the back of the Comprehensive Spending Review.  Even then, it 
will come with additional and understandable student demands for value-for-money, 
as well as therefore with further pressure on academics’ already stretched work time.  
However, in one sense this merely promises more of the same.  The headline changes 
to the sector in the New Labour years were dominated by the increasing numbers of 
students who were accessing higher education and universities’ concerns about 
whether the basic unit of resource and the capital investment budget would keep pace 
as a means of enabling the system to cope with the extra numbers.  This ensured that 
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universities were already required to work their staff harder in order to make scarce 
resources go further. 
 
Yet if that is the economic situation, what about the broader political economy of UK 
higher education?  My argument in the pages that follow is that the true significance 
of the impending cuts to university funding can only be understood in relation to the 
changing British model of welfare.  If the answer to the question ‘what are 
universities now for?’ is simply to provide degree programmes as cheaply as possible 
from the perspective of the state then the forthcoming retrenchment of their budgets is 
a relatively straightforward mechanism for matching means and ends.  As I seek to 
show, though, the situation is more complex than that.  Britain now has an 
increasingly bifurcated welfare model, with one part of its provision continuing to 
take place through traditional structures of transfer payments and the other part now 
ever more reliant on the management of asset prices.  Universities currently sit 
uncomfortably with one foot in each camp.  Degree programmes are consistently 
under-priced relative to their true cost of delivery, and there is nothing in the Browne 
Review which will stop this being the case for the sector as a whole.  The result is that 
higher education institutions are direct welfare providers to the overwhelmingly 
middle-class children enrolled as students.  At the same time, universities have 
become increasingly vulnerable to a value-for-money backlash, with parents reluctant 
to see their children graduate with the scale of debt implied by Browne.  This is 
despite the fact that learning to manage a life of debt is itself the only route into the 
asset-based systems of welfare which are increasingly taking over from transfer 
payments systems for those who can afford to be incorporated into them.  It is the 
middle classes, of course, who benefit the most from these new systems, even as they 
are becoming more politically reticent about using a university education as a 
formative experience for their children of the principles of asset-based welfare.  The 
higher education sector, then, already occupies a potentially contradictory position 
with respect to the increasingly bifurcated British model of welfare, and the 
impending cuts threaten to explode these latent contradictions in presently 
unpredictable ways for those who work within the sector. 
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Public Sector Austerity and the Changing British Welfare Model 
 
It should go without saying that the current squeeze on public sector spending is a 
result of the recent banking crisis.  In particular, it follows the Brown Government 
finding itself faced with having to make largely open-ended financial commitments to 
stabilise banks’ balance sheets or else run the risk of outright bank collapses.  If the 
scale of the cuts now being introduced is eye-watering in its potential reach into the 
public sector, it is also merely a reflection of the scale of the previous transposition of 
private banking debts into public debt.  The Brown Government authorised the Bank 
of England to spend pretty much whatever it took to relieve banks of the 
responsibility of continuing to carry failed investments and failed loans on their 
balance sheets.  In April 2008, the Special Liquidity Scheme was established to allow 
banks to swap distressed assets linked to the collapsing mortgage lending and 
mortgage securitisation markets.  Initially the swaps took place between increasingly 
worthless privately originated assets and government debt which was all but 
guaranteed to maintain its value; latterly they took place directly for public cash.  This 
ensured that by one means or another the uncoverable liabilities that brought many 
banks to the point of bankruptcy as the credit economy stalled became the property of 
the state instead.
2
 
 
What we have seen in action, then, is a logic of crisis displacement.  In a game of 
political hot potato, the banks were deemed to be too important to have to face the 
consequences of their own errant decision-making, encouraging the state to socialise 
the banks’ losses and then to decide whereabouts in society the consequences of such 
a strategy was to be felt most keenly.  It was a deliberate move by the Coalition 
Government to use its first few weeks in power to institutionalise the expectation of 
looming austerity.  Politically charged and politically motivated though it may have 
been, it was also an acknowledgement that socialised losses have to be repaid 
somehow.  Universities will be just one part of the public sector left holding the 
potato as significant distance is placed between the origin of the banking crisis and the 
site of the disruption caused by trying to manage its fallout. 
 
The fact that a ‘business as usual’ approach was generally adopted when trying to put 
the financial economy back on its feet is telling in this respect.  Despite the massive 
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help that banks required following systematic miscalculations of the price of their 
accumulated balance-sheet liabilities, they have not had their ability to price the credit 
they sell to customers taken away from them.  This is no doubt for fear of the adverse 
signalling effect that doing so would have when attempting to rebuild the status of the 
City of London as a global financial centre.  However, that decision – or, perhaps 
more accurately, that non-decision – has had politically anomalous effects.  Taxpayers 
have been passed the bill for resuscitating banks’ bottom lines to maintain them as 
going concerns, while bank customers have also paid the cost of higher credit as 
banks have responded to the confidence shock of the credit crunch by pricing loans in 
a more risk-averse fashion.  Yet, there are always occasions in which taxpayers and 
bank customers are one and the same people.  This means that the bank bailouts 
formalised a redistributive mechanism whereby many people were forced to pay twice 
over for problems that were not of their making.  The full impact of the public 
expenditure cuts will almost certainly constitute a third payment when understood in 
opportunity cost terms. 
 
Throughout all this, taxpayers will be required to continue finding money to finance a 
process which will make them materially worse off.  In circumstances in which 
people are made poorer, the typical response is an enhanced demand for state support 
of personal welfare.  The budget for transfer payments always experiences greater 
pressure when individuals are given reduced alternatives to cater for their own needs 
in other ways.  The significance thus comes to light of the Coalition Government’s 
attempt to repay the public debt caused by the bank bailouts by stripping away 
existing programmes of public expenditure.  By taking that option and not exploring 
others, it is almost certain that established systems of transfer payments will 
experience extra demands at a moment at which they are not financially predisposed 
even to cope with existing ones.  Put somewhat bluntly, state support of personal 
welfare will become increasingly unaffordable just when it will be needed more than 
at any time in the near past. 
 
There has, in any case, been a recent move away from delivering additional 
increments of personal welfare through a system of transfer payments organised by 
the state.  This makes it no less ironic – or politically salient – that ordinary people are 
now being asked to pay up to three times over for the mechanism through which they 
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will have the right further taken away from them to access public welfare.  Yet, it is 
important to note that this trend was already in train in other ways well before the 
onset of the recent banking crisis.  Expanding the structure of state support for welfare 
claimants is feasible only in the context of expanding the fiscal basis of the state.  
Notwithstanding arguments in the UK about stealth taxes and the reality of shifting 
the tax burden increasingly from income to consumption, the decisive moves over the 
last three decades have all been in the opposite direction.  The refutation of ‘tax and 
spend’ as an appropriate political platform for a modern finance-based economy has 
curtailed the fiscal space within which redistributive strategies might be adopted.  It 
has also triggered the search for ways to reduce commitments embedded in the 
transfer payment budget.  One response to the problem of how to make welfare 
expenditures more affordable has simply been to make welfare entitlements less 
generous.  Another response has been to innovate in brand new ways of delivering 
welfare that bypass transfer payments altogether. 
 
Most progress has been made in this latter sense through the turn towards an asset-
based system of welfare.
3
  The logic of such a system depends entirely on the 
willingness to allow the financial economy to replace the state as the means through 
which the individual might access welfare-enhancing services.  The state does not 
become completely inactive under systems of asset-based welfare, yet it is able to 
vacate the responsibility for paying directly for the individual to receive welfare as it 
has to do under systems of transfer payments.  It becomes the responsibility of the 
individual to self-fund access to welfare-enhancing services through the accumulation 
of assets, whereas the role of the state becomes to guarantee access to assets in the 
first place.  This latter role is less costly than settling the bill directly for each welfare 
service for which the individual might have need, which almost certainly is why an 
asset-based system of welfare has been seized upon by British governments who have 
been either hesitant about or hostile to the alternative tax and spend agenda. 
 
Under such systems, individuals are asked to imagine themselves as holders of a 
lifetime income, which will consist of income already earned, income currently being 
earned and income still to be earned.
4
  At any stage of the lifetime income profile, 
current income can either be saved or spent.  Indeed, it can be ‘overspent’ in the sense 
that rebalancing the relationship between saving and spending can be deferred until 
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the future to temporarily allow current expenditure to be higher than current income.  
The objective of acculturating individuals to an asset-based system of welfare can 
actually only ever be satisfied by encouraging people to overspend in this way at 
relatively early stages of lifetime income.  Individuals can only subsequently position 
themselves to benefit from an asset-based system of welfare if they already own 
assets.  While the state can be relied upon to offer an initial hand-up in this respect 
then that is almost certainly all it will do.  Much more likely, individuals will be 
required to purchase credit from banks as part of their overspending at relatively early 
stages of lifetime income, to then invest that credit in assets which it is hoped will 
increase in value at a faster pace than money saved in interest-bearing bank accounts. 
 
This, in many ways, is the crux of the operation of an asset-based system of welfare.  
If the financial economy is sufficiently dynamic to enable asset prices to rise 
consistently faster than the rate of interest, individuals will be able to purchase for 
themselves a greater number of welfare-enhancing services in later life the more that 
they have used credit in earlier life to load up on asset holdings.  Successful 
negotiation of the internal dynamics of an asset-based system of welfare is therefore 
conditional for most people on learning how to manage a life lived a long time in 
debt.  The purchase of credit has its flip-side in the embrace of debt, so debt lies at the 
heart of acquiring assets.  The reason for holding assets in such a system is that they 
might be cashed-in when they are worth more than their original market price and that 
the ensuing cash flow multiplies the amount of welfare-enhancing services the initial 
income could have purchased.  Any engagement with this process is about enhancing 
the real value of income, and debt is the mechanism through which that process is 
activated. 
 
This in turn perhaps helps to explain why the priority of the bank bailouts appears to 
have been rebuilding the financial economy in its pre-crisis form rather than 
fireproofing it from similar crisis manifestations in the future.  The prevailing 
structure of welfare provision in the UK is as yet by no means one of balance between 
transfer payments and asset-based delivery.  However, the dominant trend is 
undoubtedly to move closer towards balance by shifting ever more of the provision 
from the former to the latter.  Allowing financial markets free rein to continue to price 
both the credit through which people purchase assets and the assets themselves serves 
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to protect the logic of an asset-based system of welfare much more effectively than 
price regulation.  The Special Liquidity Scheme was designed to allow banks to 
cleanse their balance sheets of failed assets, quantitative easing was designed to allow 
them to continue originating new assets and to provide credit economy conditions 
suited to selling them, while numerous interventions were made to keep homeowners 
in their homes and therefore to prevent more exaggerated falls in house prices.  These 
are all examples of using policy levers to ensure that those who had already invested 
most in the structure of asset-based welfare had least to fear from the implosion of 
banks’ balance sheets due to the systematic mis-pricing of mortgage-backed assets 
and the equally systematic overselling of mortgage credit. 
 
The fact that the opportunity cost of such interventions has been the ability to finance 
existing entitlements to welfare-enhancing transfer payments is deeply instructive.  It 
demonstrates quite clearly that the British economy is currently embedded within a 
clash of welfare cultures, whereby the advance of the coming welfare model appears 
to be at least partly conditional upon destroying the fiscal basis of the previously 
dominant model.  The system of transfer payments and the system of asset-based 
delivery are based on incommensurable policy foundations.  Prioritising the latter 
must therefore necessarily come at the cost of the sustainability of the former.  In this 
respect, the content and the implications of the bank bailouts do not represent a break 
with past practice so much as confirmation of the trend that was already in play.  The 
certainty that the Coalition Government’s public spending cuts will emasculate the 
system of transfer payments still further is merely another reflection of the shifting 
centre of gravity within the British welfare model, rather than its cause per se. 
 
While laden with implications in its own right, none of this yet explains why 
knowledge of changing British welfare norms helps us to understand the political 
economy of UK higher education.  This is the task that I set myself in the following 
section, with potentially worrying implications for the pressures that are likely to 
ensue for those who work within the university sector.  My argument is that the 
current structure of UK higher education itself reflects the clash of culture which 
splits the British welfare model in two.  Universities – and by implication also their 
employees – are increasingly required to serve two welfare masters at once.  Recent 
changes in the financing of the student experience have served to place students in 
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debt at a much earlier stage of lifetime income than would otherwise have been likely, 
and the implications of the Browne Review report will merely exaggerate such a 
trend.  In effect, university has been increasingly rebranded from students’ 
perspective as the first asset to ‘overspend’ on in a lifetime of accumulating assets.  At 
the same time, even in the context of Browne, a university education will continue to 
be under-priced for UK students relative to its true cost of delivery.  As such, and 
despite the headlines which will focus on increased fee levels, it will remain a cheap 
form of middle-class welfare along the lines of the traditional transfer payment model. 
 
 
 
The Welfare Demands on the Higher Education Sector 
 
Universities currently sit on the cusp of the new and the old when it comes to their 
role straddling the clash of welfare cultures evident within British society more 
generally.  Neither aspect of this role emerged in explicitly articulated form from 
reasoned public debate about the overall purpose of the university sector.  Equally, 
neither in any direct sense fulfils the broader intellectual functions most obviously 
associated with the sector.  One is about presenting university as an investment which 
students make in their lifetime income profile; the other is about freeing the state from 
responsibility for funding the system which provides investment opportunities of this 
nature.  Neither is about education in and of itself. 
 
The reality of working within universities during the New Labour years has been 
teaching increasing numbers of students within a more heavily audited system of 
quality control.  Quite clearly, this is not a costless exercise for those delivering 
degree programmes.  It also imposes new cognitive and behavioural characteristics for 
students to learn if they are to flourish within a generally under-funded sector.  The 
options on student financing that have been consistently overlooked are as 
informative in this regard as the one that has been acted upon.  As a matter of 
principle, the idea that students should pay towards their own education is almost 
wholly unchallenged by the UK’s political classes except when means testing shows it 
to be exclusionary in practice.  The non-appearance in public debates of the 
possibility of returning to grant-financed higher education is itself a sign of just how 
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far political opinion has moved away from a tax and spend agenda.  Further evidence 
along the same lines is provided by the Business Secretary Vince Cable’s very public 
out-manoeuvring following the communication to Browne of his preference for the 
introduction of a graduate tax.  Associated cognitive and behavioural characteristics 
of reliance on transfer payments remove both grants and the idea of a graduate tax 
from the equation, because such a system of student financing is deemed to create a 
generation that believes in and expects the wrong things from the state. 
 
The option that had already been taken up, as well as the one that will be significantly 
reinforced by Browne, is to require fees to be paid through student loans.  This, of 
course, is directly analogous to the purchase of bank-based personal debt.  Going to 
university for all but the most fortunate now involves learning not only the subject 
matter of the relevant academic field but also how to think of higher education as an 
investment and how to think of that investment as a lifetime income decision.  It 
involves engaging not only with the expectations of academic members of staff but 
also with the expectations of the banks that provide students with their debt facilities 
in the first place.  The skills of personal debt management rival the intellectual 
assumptions of their chosen specialist field as the most important objective of 
students’ socialisation.  They are required to learn prudential techniques to prevent 
overspending at the early stage of lifetime income from becoming an increasingly less 
worthwhile investment in higher education.  A self-oriented actuarialism is implied, 
whereby students come to value different educational choices with respect to their 
relative capacities for expanding lifetime income flows.  Poor personal debt 
management during their student years inhibits individuals’ subsequent ability to 
invest further in boosting overall lifetime income, whereas good personal debt 
management keeps that possibility in play. 
 
In essence, the character traits that enable students to survive in a system of debt-
financed university education are no different to those which acculturate people to an 
asset-based system of welfare.  Both rely on exactly the same form of social 
engineering and a commitment to the same broad understanding of macroeconomic 
priorities.  The particular type of prudence required to manage adaptation to both 
systems is not one that questions the relationship between prudential behaviour and a 
life lived in debt, so much as one that encourages the embrace of debt, but then 
 11 
emphasises its use for the long-term purpose of enhancing personal wealth.  The 
prudent student emulates the prudent welfare recipient in viewing the purchase of 
bank-provided credit in the short run as a means of creating life chances that are 
liberated from dependence on the state in the long run.  If government policy is to 
succeed in its own terms, the welfare recipient of the future will measure his or her 
success in building up an asset base by how far late-life consumption possibilities will 
transcend the limits placed on consumption by the prevailing level of transfer 
payments.  Students today are increasingly being asked to think of investments in 
higher education as part of the process of transcendence.  A university degree will 
enhance their labour market standing, so they are told, which in turn transposes that 
degree into some sort of return-bearing asset.  Higher rewards accompany enhanced 
labour market standing, allowing ‘underspending’ when at peak earnings potential not 
only to cancel out the money that was paid for the university degree, but also to 
finance the purchase of actual assets in pursuit of enhanced late-life consumption 
possibilities. 
 
The social engineering inherent in the prevailing system of debt-based student 
financing is therefore most evident in the use of universities as a training ground for 
the new model citizen of asset-based welfare.  Higher education now acts as an 
exemplar, not of the personal fulfilment which results from pursuing educational 
attainments as a good in their own right, but of a life of constant asset accumulation 
through the strategic management of personal debt.  Within such a structure banks 
increasingly replace the state as the most important facilitator of the university 
experience for most students.  Yet, this also serves to confirm the power that the 
banks enjoy within society: to consciously set out to live a life of strategic debt 
management is also to accept a life of indebtedness to banks.  The model citizen of 
asset-based welfare first takes out a student loan to go to university; then folds 
outstanding student debt into a mortgage loan to become a first-time buyer on the 
housing market; then continually trades up on that market by rolling over mortgage 
debt to increase the capital gains embedded in rising house prices; only latterly to 
trade down in retirement so that the capital gains can be cashed in and used for late-
life consumption of welfare-enhancing goods.  Every step involved in getting to the 
point of being able to cash in accumulated assets requires the dependence of 
individuals upon banks as well as the ability and the willingness of banks to issue 
 12 
credit.  Indeed the further that people proceed towards reimagining themselves as 
model citizens of asset-based welfare the more they stand to lose should banks’ 
credit-creating functions suddenly falter.  The public sector cuts following in the wake 
of the bank bailout programme are themselves recognition of sorts of the social 
significance now placed on defending those functions at apparently all costs.  This 
places universities in a peculiarly paradoxical position.  They are now an essential 
element in the everyday embrace of personal debt and in the enhanced dependence of 
people on banks’ credit-creating function, but at the same time they will be hit hard as 
40% cuts are introduced to their funding as a result of securing banks’ credit-creating 
function within the recent crisis. 
 
It is this second aspect that brings more clearly into view universities’ currently 
uncomfortable position spanning the clash of welfare cultures in modern Britain.  
Despite having been increasingly repositioned as a training ground for the new model 
citizen of asset-based welfare, the higher education sector also continues to act as a 
direct welfare provider of a more traditional type.  Given the social characteristics of 
most student cohorts this is – on the whole but with some important exceptions – a 
distinctively middle-class form of welfare.  New Labour’s drive to bring more people 
into higher education increased access and continued, as a consequence, to challenge 
the link between a university education and outright social privilege.  However, it also 
meant that a university education became an increasingly necessary experience for the 
middle classes if they are to guard against losing social status by no longer 
monopolising entry into the professions.  The increased accessibility of higher 
education in recent years has mainly been exploited by children of middle-class 
families seeking to preserve that status.  There are aspects of the student experience of 
universities that now come close to resembling some sort of finishing school for 
middle-class children, with access to that experience increasingly coming to be 
defined as a right of middle-class social reproduction.  Exercising that right while 
relying on public support of under-priced degree programmes to do so is no different 
in essence to the old system of welfare provision via transfer payments. 
 
The use of higher education as a means of middle-class social reproduction currently 
takes place in a context in which the British labour market simply could not take on 
the same role.  From the 1980s onwards the decision has been to try to source British 
 13 
competitiveness through emphasising the flexibility of the labour market.
5
  One of the 
more obvious weaknesses of such a strategy is that it offers employers few incentives 
to invest in the long-term skills acquisition of recently hired workers.  Given that it is 
cheaper to buy in those skills in workers who have already accumulated on-the-job 
experience, this skews the operation of the labour market against new entrants.  As a 
result, the more flexible the labour market typically the higher the relative rates of 
unemployment in the 16-25 age range.  Also from the 1980s onwards successive 
governments have appropriated the university experience as a means of seeking 
political shelter from more extreme instances of youth unemployment.  As the middle 
classes have been the most obvious beneficiaries of the expansion in university places 
they have also benefited the most from using universities to disguise the full impact of 
youth unemployment in this way. 
 
The pre-Browne capping of student fees created incentives for young people to delay 
their entrance into a particularly hostile segment of the labour market until they were 
better equipped to thrive there.  Even in the post-Browne world it is inconceivable 
that more than a few elite universities will be able to charge the full market value of 
their degree programmes.  As a consequence, an informal cap will remain in operation 
within the sector as a whole as institutions seek to differentiate themselves by 
matching their fee level to the social profile of their typical student cohort.  The 
retention of such a cap – however much it is dressed up in the language of ‘market 
pricing’ – will continue to make it possible for middle-class students to envision the 
experience of higher education as an affordable asset.  Consequently, it is to be 
presumed that they will continue to want to invest in a university place as the first step 
to becoming a model citizen of asset-based welfare.  Yet, it also means that students 
do not have to pay the full market price for accessing a viable alternative to a segment 
of the labour market that otherwise would be unable to disguise its true level of 
unemployment.  In what is a classic case of the logic of transfer payment, the full 
costs of that opportunity are born elsewhere.  The direct recipients of the benefits of 
the deliberate under-pricing of degree programmes to UK students – the implications 
of Browne notwithstanding – are not the same people who make good the costs of the 
under-pricing.  This ties students into a redistributive relationship with the higher 
education sector, through which universities are the welfare providers and students are 
the welfare claimants. 
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However, this does not yet tell the full story, because it does not say how, exactly, 
universities discharge their welfare provider responsibilities in this instance.  The gap 
between home and overseas students’ fees shows exactly how much degree 
programmes are under-priced to UK students relative to the cost of delivery, let alone 
to the subsequent labour market value of holding the degree.  Browne might well 
close this gap to some extent, but it will not eliminate it entirely.  In general, its 
existence is financed directly by the teaching staff in university departments, as the 
welfare service they provide encroaches into the time that should be set aside for other 
professional activities and those activities, in turn, are increasingly performed as if 
they were voluntary acts.  If we think about the historical creep in working hours of 
nurses, doctors and school teachers, for instance, we see that large parts of the post-
war British welfare state have remained functional only through enhanced reliance on 
the goodwill of the service providers.  In this respect the higher education sector has 
increasingly become a prime example of a transfer payments model in which the 
transfer involves the unpaid appropriation of the time of the service providers. 
 
This places a novel but perhaps rather discomforting twist on the question of what 
universities are now for.  The UK higher education sector continues to have an 
enviable record worldwide for the quality of the research undertaken and the quality 
of the degree programmes delivered.  Yet, so much of this reputation depends today 
on further stretching the goodwill on which the sector relies and to test its pliability in 
the face of accelerating workplace demands.  A good proportion of the effort 
expended by academic members of staff in protecting the world-renowned status of 
British universities now has to remain unaccounted for in workload models built 
around standard contractual obligations.  The question of what universities are now 
for can be answered, at least in part, as providing a mechanism through which the 
goodwill of public sector employees is used as a substitute for proper funding of 
public services.  This is a particularly sobering thought in the context of knowing that 
civil servants are now preparing the details of a further 40% reduction in public 
spending on UK universities. 
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Conclusion 
 
The history of public spending cuts in the UK is that they usually draw attention away 
from long-term trajectories of change and place it instead on the short-term priority of 
making the books balance.  Moreover, the cuts currently being planned are more 
extreme than almost anything that has gone before.  There is every possibility in such 
circumstances that the pressures of doing more teaching on less pay and with fewer 
resources will eat up the time to reflect on how the purpose of university teaching has 
changed under the new political economy model of UK higher education.  In the 
preceding pages I have described that purpose as a form of social engineering linked 
to two distinct types of welfare provision.  Yet, these two models are built upon 
fundamentally incommensurable understandings of the relationship between the 
individual and the state, of the basis of state legitimacy and of the preferred 
constitution of economic subjectivity.  The contradictory pressures already in play 
suggest that something somewhere within the higher education sector will have to 
give sometime soon.  The fact that the impending cuts will produce a context devoid 
of a viable solution equally acceptable to all university stakeholders makes it likely 
that the eruption will be a significant one. 
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 An earlier version of this paper was delivered on July 12
th
 2010 as the keynote address to the 
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